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EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE
United States v. Gubelman
The standard for admissibility of evidence of other crimes in
federal criminal prosecutions is set forth in Rule 404(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.' While Rule 404(b) specifically excludes
other crimes evidence offered merely to show the defendant's bad
Rule 404 codifies the rule, long established at common law, that evidence of other
crimes or acts offered solely to show the defendant's character or disposition to commit the
charged crime should be excluded. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 189-190 (2d ed. 1972); 2
J. WauNsm i & M. BEaEa, WEINmN's EVDENCE 404 [04] (1977); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE
§§ 193-194 (2d ed. 1940); Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1956); Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 766-68
(1961). See generally Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARv. L. REv. 988 (1938).
While consistent with this general "rule," Rule 404(b) permits other crimes evidence to
be admitted for other purposes. FED. R. Evm. 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
In the original version of Rule 404(b), the second sentence began with the phrase: "This
subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered ...... H.R. REp. No. 93-650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7081. The
Report of the Committee of the Judiciary, in altering the language of Rule 404(b) to its
present form, explained that the amended "formulation properly placed greater emphasis on
admissibility than did the final [Supreme] Court version." H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7081. This
codification of the common-law rule reflected an inclusionary approach that favored the
admission of other crimes evidence if relevant. See id. Evidence of other crimes was to be
admitted except when offered only to demonstrate criminal character, thus establishing a
"broader range of admissibility." United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1967)
(quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 n.7 (1967)). This "inclusionary approach" has
long been accepted by the Second Circuit, United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d
Cir. 1967), and has gained acceptance in other circuits as well. See, e.g., United States v.
Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 998 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939 (1977); United States v.
Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1977).
Once other crimes evidence is found to be admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial judge
should apply Rule 403 to determine if there are factors counselling against the jury being
presented with the evidence. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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character or propensity to commit the charged crime, 2 it goes on to
enumerate several purposes for which such evidence may be admit-
ted.' One of these "exceptions" permits the admission of other
crimes evidence where identity is at issue. Although there is not a
well-developed body of case law on the identity exception, questions
have arisen concerning its intended scope. With little legislative
history available to aid in interpreting Rule 404(b), one circuit has
2 FED. R. EvIn. 404(b); see, e.g., United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 2857 (1978);
United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Scholle, 553
F.2d 1109, 1121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v. Dansker, 537
F.2d 40, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). See generally 10 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 404.2111]-[2] (2d ed. 1976); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE 404[081 (1977). This rule is apparently not of constitutional proportions. See id.
T 404[041. The Supreme Court has held that the introduction of other crimes evidence for
sentencing purposes before a verdict on guilt is not a violation of due process. Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967).
The issue for which the evidence is admitted must actually be in dispute. See United
States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246,
1249 (2d Cir. 1978). If the fact is proven by other evidence, or is conceded, the other crimes
evidence is not admissible. United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1006-10 (6th Cir. 1975);
United States v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Fierson, 419
F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1969).
See note 1 supra. The purposes listed in Rule 404(b) for which evidence of other crimes
may properly be admitted are intended to be illustrative only. C. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE §
190, at 447-52 (2d ed. 1972); 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 404.21121, at 113 (2d ed. 1976);
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 404[08], at 42 (1977).
In determining whether other crimes evidence meets the federal standard, the trial court
is afforded wide discretion. See United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S.Ct. 577 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1977) (en
banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); United States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 702 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939 (1977); United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 904 (1977); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976). The
wide latitude afforded the trial judge in determining the ultimate admissibility of evidence
is based on his
superior position to evaluate the impact of the evidence, since he sees the witnesses,
defendant, jurors, and counsel, and their mannerisms and reactions. He is therefore
able, on the basis of personal observation, to evaluate the impressions made by
witnesses, whereas we [the appellate court] must deal with the cold record.
United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d at 514 (citation omitted); see United States v. Long, 574
F.2d at 767; Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 663 (1971). Appellate courts generally are reluctant to reverse a trial
court's exercise of discretion. 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 403.02[4], at 73-74 (2d ed.
1976); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 401[01] at 7 (1977); see note
35 infra. This wide discretion, in effect, grants the lower court "a limited right to be wrong."
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, 38 THE Omo BAR 819, 823 (1965). Such discretion does not,
however, imply "immunity from accountability." United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d at 519
(Oakes, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir. 1976)); 1
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 401101], at 8.1 (1977). See also Michel-
son v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948).
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chosen to limit this exception to cases in which the other crimes and
the charged crime share enough unique characteristics so that an
inference may be drawn that all were the handiwork of the same
individual.' Recently, however, in United States v. Gubelman,5 the
Second Circuit rejected such a limitation and held that mere relev-
ance to the issue of identity provides a sufficient basis for the admis-
sion of other crimes evidence.'
Robert Gubelman was a federal meat inspector for the United
States Department of Agriculture who was indicted on two counts
of accepting bribes in connection with his official duties.' In its
direct case the Government elicited testimony from two owners of
meat packing companies, both named in the indictment, that the
defendant requested and obtained regular payments from them.
Officers of two other plants, not named in the indictment, testified
that they also had given weekly payments to Gubelman? Gubelman
denied receiving money or anything else of value from any meat-
packer and argued that the government witnesses had mistakenly
identified him.'0 In rebuttal, the prosecution introduced evidence to
show that the defendant had accepted cigars and packages of meat
products on two other occasions." Following his conviction on both
counts, Gubelman appealed.
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed.' 2 Writing for the ma-
jority, Judge Feinberg' 3 utilized the two-part test of admissibility
traditionally applied to other crimes evidence.'4 The court initially
determined that the testimony regarding similar acts was admissi-
ble under Rule 404(b) since it was relevant to the identification of
See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
571 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2853 (1978).
571 F.2d at 1255 & n.12.
Id. at 1253. Gubelman's duties as a federal meat inspector included enforcing sanitary
regulations at meatpacking plants to ensure that meat was properly branded and of good
quality. Id.
I Id. at 1254. These payments were the subject of the indictment and ranged in amount
from $20 to $50. Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1254.
" In his summation to the jury, defense counsel argued:
So there is no question in my mind that when they picked him out they were picking
out the wrong guy. . . . I say to you that there is not one shred of credible evidence
to associate this inspector. . . with having taken one thing, one thing of value.
Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original).
" Id. A meat packer testified that he gave cigars to Gubelman. In addition, a surveillance
agent took a movie of a meat packing company employee placing two bundles that allegedly
contained meat products in Gubelman's car. Id. at 1254 & n.5.
, Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1254. Judge Timbers concurred in Judge Feinberg's opinion. Judge Mansfield
filed a dissenting opinion.
" See notes 2-3 supra. See also United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 53:316
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
the defendant as the person who accepted the bribes.'5 In concluding
that Gubelman "sufficiently raised the issue of mistaken identity at
trial to justify the admission" of the evidence, Judge Feinberg
pointed to defense counsel's cross-examination of Government wit-
nesses on their ability to identify the defendant, Gubelman's testi-
mony indicating that the witnesses "erred in their identification,"
and defense counsel's remarks in summation that the "wrong guy"
was being accused. 6
'1 571 F.2d at 1254-55. The majority observed that the Government had contended that
the "other crimes" evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show Gubelman's "pattern
of conduct," and to counter his defense of mistaken identity. Id. at 1254. The court expressed
uncertainty that the evidence would be admissible to show appellant's common scheme or
plan, since it was unclear that the other crimes evidence was intertwined with the bribes
forming the basis for the indictment. Id.
Evidence of common schemes or plans is generally related to transactions where either
the evidence is necessary to complete the narrative of the charged crime or to demonstrate
the existence of an ongoing scheme wherein one crime is committed in preparation for the
commission of the charged crime. See United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.
1978). In United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978), decided the same day by
the same panel and involving similar facts, the court indicated that evidence of other bribes
might be admissible to show a continuing plan to receive payoffs by meat inspectors seeking
to capitalize on their position. Id. at 1249; see United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 260
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973); United States v. Laurelli, 293 F.2d 830, 832 (3d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 961 (1962). See generally 2 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 404[09], at 57-61 (1977). While the Gubelman court seemed less
willing to accept the common plan or scheme theory, see 571 F.2d at 1254, it did not have to
resolve that issue since it found the evidence admissible under the identity exception. See
id. In response to the Government's suggestion that the other bribes evidence might be
admissible to show knowledge and intent, the court stated that these issues were only techni-
cally in dispute. Id. at 1254 n.8 (citing United States v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 483-84 (2d
Cir. 1970)).
1, 571 F.2d at 1255; see note 10 supra. It is not necessary that other crimes be proven
"beyond a reasonable doubt" for admission. A somewhat lesser quantum of proof is accepta-
ble. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5249, at 431-32
(1978). Most federal appellate courts seem to require clear and convincing proof. See, e.g.,
United States v. David, 551 F.2d 233, 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 923 (1977); United
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d
318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit, however, seems to require only proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d 923, 932 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 995 S. Ct. 112 (1978); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
In Gubelman, the Second Circuit sustained the admission of the other crimes evidence
to prove identity on the ground that the defendant raised the issue. 571 F.2d at 1254-55. It
should be noted that although the identity issue was raised by the defendant, part of the
other crimes evidence was admitted in the government's case in chief, prior to the defendant's
claim of mistaken identity. Id. at 1253-54. While it is permissible to admit other criines
evidence to prove an element of the crime, see United States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 219
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 912 (1977), it is preferred that the evidence be withheld until
the end of the defendant's case. See United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1092 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
958 (1976); United States v. Kaufman, 453 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Having decided that the "other crimes" evidence was relevant
to prove the identity of the defendant under Rule 404(b), the court
turned its attention to Rule 403, which requires the exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value. 7 Looking first to the testimony re-
garding similar acts offered on the Government's direct case, Judge
Feinberg characterized it as "strongly probative on the identifica-
tion issue. . . .[and] not inflammatory in the way that an unre-
lated violent crime might be."' 8 Thus, the court upheld the admis-
sion of the testimony since there was no clear indication that any
prejudice which may have resulted from the evidence of other
crimes substantially outweighed its probative value.'9 On the other
hand, the majority stated that the Government's rebuttal evidence
concerning Gubelman's acceptance of cigars and meat products
probably should have been excluded. 0 In view of the strong evidence
indicating Gubelman's guilt and the broad latitude afforded a trial
judge, however, the court did not find that the judge abused his
discretion .21
" See FED. R. EVID. 403; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404110],
at 66 (1977); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 769 (1961).
11 571 F.2d at 1255. In contrast, Chief Justice Burger, while sitting on the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pointed out that evidence of the commission of
the same crime, as opposed to an unrelated one, could be damning because juries might easily
infer that, since the defendant committed a crime before, he probably did it again. See
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See generally Dolan, Rule 403:
The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 So. CAIF. L. REv. 220, 220-39 (1976); Note: Other Crimes
Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 773-74 (1961).
1 571 F.2d at 1255-56. Under Rule 403, the potential for prejudice must "substantially"
outweigh the probative value of the evidence to warrant exclusion; slight prejudice is insuffi-
cient. See United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 577 (1978);
United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 893 (1977);
United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1966); 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
403.023 (2d ed. 1976). For a discussion of prejudice generally, see Dolan, Rule 403: The
Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 So. CALIF. L. REv. 220 (1976).
The "necessity" doctrine, advocated by some courts, see, e.g., United States v. Rice, 550
F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977), makes the need for the evidence
a factor to be weighed in balancing probative value and prejudice. See United States v.
Cochran, 546 F.2d 27, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, other crimes evidence would be excluded
when the prosecution has sufficient evidence for proof beyond a reasonable doubt without it.
One commentator has criticized the necessity test as "too mechanical to work." 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[10], at 67 (1977). Another commentator
has pointed out that the necessity test serves to exclude evidence only when it is least likely
to affect the outcome, and admitted when the prejudicial effect would be maximized. Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 771-73
(1961).
11 571 F.2d at 1255. The court termed the testimony on the acceptance of the cigars and
packages as "equivocal." Id.
21 Id. at 1256; see note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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In his dissent, Judge Mansfield stated that the "mere showing
of general similarity" between the crime charged and evidence of
other similar acts was insufficient to satisfy the identity exception
of Rule 404(b) .2 Citing other circuits which apply a stricter stan-
dard,m he reasoned that the crime in question and the other acts
sought to be admitted must have "unique and specific characteris-
tics" in common, such as a similar "modus operandi," in order to
render them admissible on the identity issue.24 The dissent stated
that, without a showing of "uniqueness" in conduct, the admission
of similar acts would "identify" the defendant as the perpetrator of
the charged crime merely by providing a basis for the inference that
he was likely to engage in similar conduct again .2- Judge Mansfield
concluded that evidence of bribetaking by Gubelman on other occa-
sions, without more, served only to demonstrate "a propensity for
bribe-taking," and shed no light on his identity as the person who
had committed the crimes in question.2 1
22 571 F.2d at 1256 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
2 Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1207
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States
v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248, 252
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097 (1968)).
21 571 F.2d at 1256 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). To support his belief that there must be
unique and specific characteristics common to both acts, Judge Mansfield quoted from
United States v. Benedetto, decided the same day. 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978). In Benedetto,
the majority found generally similar conduct insufficient to be indicative of a common scheme -
or pattern of conduct. Id. at 1249. Benedetto, a federal meat inspector, was convicted of
receiving bribes in connection with his official duties. At his trial, the government presented
evidence of other crimes both in its direct case and in rebuttal of Benedetto's testimony that
he had never accepted bribes. See id. at 1247-48. On appeal, it was claimed that the admis-
sion of other crimes evidence was improper. Id. at 1248. The Second Circuit found that the
other crimes evidence was properly admitted to counter the defendant's character evidence.
Id. at 1250. The Benedetto court rejected the notion that the evidence of uncharged bribes
demonstrated a "unique scheme or pattern." The court stated that the method used to pass
the money, a handshake, was "about as unique as using glassine envelopes to package her-
oin." Id. at 1249. It was noted that a different view might have been taken if the bribes were
made in "an unusual way." Id.
The court relied upon the language of Professor McCormick that more is required for
admission than that the same kind of crimes have been repeated: "The device used must be
so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature." Id. (quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 190, at 449 (2d ed. 1972)). See generally, 2 J. WmSEIN & M. BERGER, WENSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
404[09], at 61-66 (1977).
Judge Mansfield's reliance on Benedetto for the proposition that uniqueness is required
for similar uncharged crimes to be admitted is questionable. In Gubelman, identity was
clearly in issue, while in Benedetto the other crimes evidence was admitted to impeach the
defendant. The Benedetto court used the "signature" standard to refute the government's
contention that Benedetto used a "unique scheme or pattern." 571 F.2d at 1249. This excep-
tion is not necessarily equivalent to identity. See id. at 1255 n.12.
571 F.2d at 1256 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 1257 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield paraphrased Rule 404(b) to
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The Gubelman majority appears to be correct in opting for a
liberal application of the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b). In con-
trast to the approach employed in Gubelman, the Fifth Circuit
maintains a strict standard of admissibility when identity alone is
in issue. 21 In that circuit, "other crimes" evidence relevant to the
defendant's identity must share such unique characteristics with
the charged crime to permit an inference that both are the handi-
work of the same individual.28 This approach seems proper when
identity is sought to be proved by demonstrating the defendant's
modus operandi. It appears overly restrictive, however, when evi-
dence of other crimes is offered to prove identity by other means,
such as rebutting an alibi defense or bolstering a witness' in-court
identification by revealing other opportunities he had to observe the
defendant. There is nothing in the legislative history of Rule 404(b)
to indicate that the Fifth Circuit's narrow construction of the ident-
ity exception was intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.2 1
When Congress enacted Rule 404(b), it apparently did not in-
tend to effect a significant change in existing federal common law
reflect the Gubelman facts: "Evidence of other . . . [bribes] is not admissible to prove
[Gubelman's propensity to take bribes] in order to show that he [took bribes at the places
charged]." Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
11 See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1153-54 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 190(9), at 144 (1978).
11 See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1977).The rationale for a
strict admissibility standard is that other crimes evidence is likely to improperly influence a
jury. See United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1148 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1973). Also implied is the notion that "a defendant
must be tried for what he did, not for who he is." United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036,
1044 (5th Cir. 1977). The Myers court stated that "[t]he probity of evidence of other crimes
where introduced [to prove identity] depends upon both the uniqueness of the modus
operandi and the degree of similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime."
Id. at 1045; see United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1974). The
Goodwin court required that other crimes and the charged crime "bear such peculiar, unique,
or bizarre similarities as to mark them as the handiwork of the same individual." Id. at 1154.
The Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits also appear to have adopted
uniqueness, signature, or handiwork as the standard for admissibility of other crimes evidence
to prove identity. See, e.g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097 (1969). Additionally, although not specifically adopting the
handiwork standard, a recent Eighth Circuit decision upheld a kidnapping conviction, find-
ing that evidence of another kidnapping attempt was properly admitted on the identity issue,
based on its similarity to the charged kidnapping. Durns v. United States, 562 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). It should be noted that McCray and Parker were
decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Neither the Ninth nor the
District of Columbia Circuits have been presented with the issue since then.
2 See note 1 supra.
[Vol. 53:316
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concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence., Still, a new
emphasis was placed on the admissibility of other crimes evidence
when offered to prove something other than the defendant's pro-
pensity to commit the charged crime.3' With respect to evidence
offered to prove identity, it was anticipated that the evidence would
be admissible if relevant.2 Therefore, evidence found to be admissi-
ble under Rule 404(b) would only be excluded if its probative value
would be substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair preju-
dice.13
The Second Circuit has long applied this liberal standard.3 4
3 See id. In addition to the identity exception, Rule 404(b) enumerates several other
purposes for which other crimes evidence may be admissible. Intent may be proven by other
crimes evidence in cases where it is an element of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Miller,
573 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bradford, 571 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S.Ct. 3100 (1978); United States v. Henciar, 568 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 953 (1978). Knowledge, often connected with intent, may be proven when the
defendant claims an unawareness that a criminal act had been committed. See, e.g., United
States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 562 F.2d 515 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Sparks, 560 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir.1977). When the prosecution seeks
to show that the defendant had a reason to commit the charged crime, evidence of other
crimes that indicates the defendant's state of mind may be admitted under the motive
exception to permit an inference that he committed the charged crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Stover, 565 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 182 (1977). Evidence of plan or design is admissible in two
situations. First, when two crimes are committed as part of the same transaction, such as
multiple thefts, the evidence is admissible to complete the story. See, e.g., United States v.
Carrillo, 561 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978). Second, other crimes evidence may be used to show that
one crime was committed in preparation for commission of another crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.), cert..denied, 99 S.Ct. 87 (1978); United States
v. Conley, 523 F.2d 650 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976).
31 H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7081; see note 1 supra.
31 Relevancy is the basic requirement for the admission of evidence. 1 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 401 [01] (1977). See generally C: McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE
§§ 184-185 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 24-36 (3d ed. 1940); Slough, Relevancy
Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1956); Comment, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE. L. REv. 167, 167-71 (1969).
Rule 401 provides that: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvIn. 401; see, e.g.,
United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d
1246 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Tibbetts, 565 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1977).
See 1 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE 403[03] (1977).
See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1967). In Deaton, decided
prior to the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Second Circuit noted that it was
among the minority of courts that had adopted the inclusionary approach to other crime
evidence. See id. at 117. After the Rules were enacted, the Second Circuit continued to take
the same view. See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1978).
A predecessor of Deaton, United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966), indicated
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Significantly, however, it seems that the facts in Gubelman did not
justify the admission of evidence of other bribetaking. Since differ-
ent witnesses testified to the charged and uncharged acts, it is diffi-
cult to see how the "other crimes" evidence could bolster the gov-
ernment's case on the mistaken identity issue, except by impermis-
sibly showing propensity. In this sense, Judge Mansfield was correct
in reasoning that something more than mere similarity was needed.
For uncharged crimes to be relevant to a defendant's identity in this
circumstance, and not solely indicative of propensity, the other
crimes ought to evince a unique modus operandi.
The result reached on the facts in Gubelman illustrates the
problems that obtain when evidence only tangentially related to an
issue other than character or propensity is found to meet the Rule
404(b) standard. Although Rule 403 theoretically works as a check
on the admission of prejudicial evidence, the broad discretion af-
forded to judges in the Second Circuit renders the availability of
appellate review an inadequate safeguard.35 Therefore, unless care-
the flexibility of the common-law "other crimes" rule. Stating that the exceptions to inadmis-
sibility were not "formalized," the Bozza court reasoned that, so long as evidence of the other
crime was "substantially relevant" to some issue other than character, it would be admissi-
ble. Id. at 213; see United States v. Bradwell, 388 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 1968). In United
States v. Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972 (1976), the court used
broad language to note that "other crimes" evidence was admissible "for all purposes except
to show [the] defendant's criminal character or disposition." Id. at 1134; accord, United
States v. Brettholz, 485 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974). The
inference to be drawn from these cases is that the Second Circuit is extremely liberal in its
use of other crimes evidence.
- In United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978), the court noted that the
Second Circuit almost always affirms the admission of other crimes evidence. Id. at 1248; see,
e.g., United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Robinson,
560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); United States v.
Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
This is due, in part, to a generally recognized belief that the trial court is in a better position
than an appellate court to weigh the factors influencing the admissibility of such evidence.
See note 4 supra. Additionally, the standard established by the Second Circuit for abuse of
discretion contributes to its reluctance to reverse.
The Second Circuit has defined abuse of discretion as an "arbitrary" or "irrational"
decision by the trial judge. United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d at 520; accord, Construction,
Ltd. v. Brooks-Skinner Bldg. Co., 488 F.2d 427, 431 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Napolitano v.
Compania Sud Americana De Vapores, 421 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1970). Hence, in United
States v. Gubelman, 571 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1978), the majority noted that while the admission
of the testimony of other bribe-taking in the government's case in chief was within the trial
court's discretion, it would not have been an abuse of discretion to exclude it for being of
questionable "necessity." Id. at 1255; see United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Johnson, 382 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Byrd,
352 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1965); note 24 supra. The Gubelman majority also remarked that,
despite its feeling that other crimes evidence offered in rebuttal should have been excluded,
it would again defer to the broad discretion of the trial judge. 571 F.2d at 1255-56. The breadth
of discretion afforded trial judges and the scope of appellate review in the circuit is exempli-
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fully applied by trial judges, the utilization of mere "relevance" as
the standard under Rule 404(b) will have the unintended effect of
permitting prejudicial character evidence to reach the jury.
Regardless of the approach taken in examining other crimes
evidence, the crucial factor to be considered is whether the evidence
is probative of an accepted purpose, or whether it merely serves to
establish the defendant's bad character. Although Rules 403 and
404(b) favor the admission of relevant evidence, 36 their application
cannot be mechanical, but rather, must also include a careful con-
sideration of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Thomas Schiels
fled by United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 512-16 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 905 (1978). There, the trial court admitted evidence concerning a gun possessed by
the defendant at his arrest, ten weeks after an armed robbery in which a similar gun was used.
560 F.2d at 512. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Second Circuit found that the
trial judge's action was not arbitrary or irrational and, therefore, upheld his exercise of
discretion. Id. at 515. Judge Mansfield, writing for the majority, stated that the "remarkable
coincidence" of that possession "tended directly to identify [defendant] as one of the partici-
pants" in the robbery. Id. at 512. In contrast, Judge Oakes viewed the evidence that the
defendant was found with a gun similar to that used in the charged crime as having "virtually
no probative significance" in view of the probability that "hundreds of thousands of persons"
possessed the same caliber gun. Id. at 520 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
3 See note 1 supra.
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